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DICKINSON LAI

REVIEW

VENDEE'S RIGHT OF ACTION IN SALES OF DEFECTIVE
FOOD AND DRINK, ETC.
PENNSYLVANIA CASES CLASSIFIED
HENRY C. KESSLER, JR.*

One of the outstanding developments of our century has been the enormous
increase in the manufacture for resale of all kinds of food products and wearing
apparel. Out of this increased business has grown a great amount of litigation
based on injuries sustained by the consumer. The courts have been called upon
to define the standards of care required of these manufacturers and compounders
in the light of new problems. The law of negligence and the law of sales
have had to be re-examined with a view to the end to be attained-justice to
both the business man and the public. A standard of care has had to be set
which would protect the consumer from the careless, the indifferent or even the
unscrupulous producer. These had to be made to realize that if they desired to
supply the public with products which were capable of injuring, they had to
maintain certain standards to avoid just such injury. On the other hand there
were the rights of the legitimate business man to be protected as well, for the
fostering of business is of benefit to the community and society.
In the field of foods, drinks, wearing apparel and similar articles the law
has developed most interestingly. The growth is indicated by the necessity, in
the early years of the century, for the Uniform Sales Act, although some legislative attempt to meet the problem had been made much earlier in some jurisdictions,' Some confusion is not unusual in the development of principles when
they are being applied to expanding situations. One of the most perplexing
problems which confronted the courts of Pennsylvania concerned the proper
mode of bringing suit in these cases. Should the action be in trespass for negligence or assurnpsit for breach of the implied warranty of wholesomeness? That
this question still causes some concern today is evident from an examination oi
the cases. 2 Much of the confusion has, however, been cleared away in this
state by the appellate court decisions, which have consistently gone into detail
3
to clarify the matter. In 1931 the Superior Court was moved to note that:
"There is considerable confusion in the decisions as to the theory
of the liability in this class of cases. Some of them hold that an
action is based upon negligence alone; others that it may be founded on an implied warranty."
*Catholic University of America, A. B. 1935, LL. B. 1937. Member Bar: Pennsylvania
Supreme Court; York County (Pa.) Courts; U. S. District (M. D. Pa.) Court; author "Effect
of Contributory Negligence of One of Several Co-Beneficaries," 44 Dickinson L. Rev. 31
(1939).
lln Penusylvania this effort is represented by the Act of May 4, 1889, P. L. 87.
2
Por example, see Gillott v. Harwitz-Solomn, 37 Lack. Jur. 65 (1936) ; Kuntz v. Pepsi-Cola
Co., 89 P. L. J. 558 (1940).
SNock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 518; 156 A. 537, 538 (1931).
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The court concluded that while "undoubtedly, an action in tort could have been
brought ...an action on the implied warranty of fitness in a sale of food or
beverage may likewise be brought."'
The purpose of this paper is to review the Pennsylvania decisions involving
actions growing out of sales of food, beverage, wearing apparel, etc., and in
view of these decisions to classify them, and to set forth the rights and liabilities of the parties in the light of the developments thus far attained by the law.
That the law is still in the development stage in this interesting field is at once
apparent from a. study of the cases.5
THE PLEADINGS

As indicated by the Nock case, 6 the action in these cases may be in trespass for
negligence or it may be in assumpsit for breach of the implied warranties imposed
by the Sales Act.7 But this is not to say that always and in all cases involving food,
drink or wearing apparel, and similar articles, this rule is applicable. It is governed
by whom plaintiff is suing. For in some important instances there is no tort liability flowing from such sales, as for example, in a sale by the retailer of an article in
its original container, of which doctrine more will be said later in this article. As
against the manufacturer or compounder the suit may be in either trespass or assumpsit, but as against the immediate vendor, not the maker of the article, trespass will not be maintainable. In the latter situation plaintiff should sue the manufacturtr. Even if the suit is brought in assumpsit, no judgment for want of an
affidavit of defense may be taken.8 This is so because the nature of the evidence
will be tortious, for the action on the warranties is really a "mixed" one since the
damages sustained are due to negligence in improperly making the article. The
pleadings should contain a brief, concise statement of the grounds of the cause,
but it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to specify the object which caused his injury if he does not know what it was, as for example, where he swallowed it.9
Is there privity of contract sufficient to support an action by the consumer
as against the manufacturer? In the Nock case,10 the Superior Court holds that
the warranties do run to the consumer who has no opportunity to examine the
goods for himself before purchase. In such cases he, "in effect, represents to each
purchaser that the contents thereof are wholesome and suitable for the purpose
for which they are sold, and the common law doctrine of caveat emplor does not
prevail. If the purchaser is without opportunity to examine for himself, as when
41bid.
6Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938); Barrett v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A. (2d) 502 (1941).
6Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 522; 156 A. 537, 539 (1931).
7Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, Sec. 15; 69 P. S. 124 etc.
8Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A. (2d) 342 (1941); Nock v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
9Murphy v. Yuengling Dairies Co., 34 D. & C. 355 (1939); contra: Kohr v. Fox Baking
Co., 31 York L. R. 161 (1917).
1ONock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 521; 156 A. 537, 539 (1931).
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he buys a bottle of beverage or a can of food, he has a right to rely upon the assurance of the manufacturer that the contents are fit and wholesome, and it is only
just and reasonable to hold him responsible.""1 If the action is in trespass, the
plaintiff sues on the basis of the negligence which caused him injury. His suit
may be against the manufacturer.12 In actions of this nature it is not necessary
that plantiff specify the particular dereliction which resulted in the harm.' 3 It is
necessary that plantiff aver that the defective food or the bottle containing the foreign substance was sold or delivered by defendant. There must be some relation14
ship between the article sold and the defendant.
THE IMMEDIATE VENDOR

Tort Liability:
1. "The original package" doctrine had its origin in Pennsylvania in the
case of West v. Emanuel.' It is one of the more important doctrines formulated
by the courts in the conflict between buyer and seller. Under it, one who purchases goods for resale in their original container assumes no tort liability if the
goods cause injury to the user.
2. If the goods, though in a sealed package, are in such a condition that
the dealer knows, or by his experience as a dealer should know, that they are unwholesome, he may be sued for his own negligence in selling under such condi16
tions.
3. If the dealer sells articles, though in their original package, and the user
is injured by defects therein which the dealer by a "cursory" inspection could have
discovered, he will be liable for breach of duty to exercise the care of a reasonably
prudent man under such circumstances.'7
4. If the buyer relies on the seller's "profession of competence and care" in
purchasing the article, the vendor will be liable for failure to exercise reasonable
18
care to supply the articles in a "safe condition for use."
5. Where the product is manufactured by a third person but the dealer sells
it as his own, he will be liable as though he were the manufacturer. 19
"Ibid.

lzRozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929); Ebbert
v. Phila. Electric
Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938); Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
106 Pa.
Super. 474, 162 A. 687 (1932).
l3 Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929).
14Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A. (2d) 342 (1941).
16198
Pa. 180, 47 A. 965 (1901).
16
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 402 and commentary thereto.
17
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 399 and Sec. 402. This is not intended to convey the

impression that there is a duty to make a "cursory" inspection. It means rather that where the
seller has some special knowledge enabling him to observe a likely harm and fails to communicate this to the buyer, it is negligence on his part and he will be liable if injury results
on this
account.
18
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 401.
9
1 REsTATMBNT OF ToRas, Sec. 400.
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6. The vendor will be liable for failure to inspect goods sold by him other
than in original packages, if injury results from such failure.20
Contract Liability:
The immediate vendor will be liable, under Section 15 of the Uniform Sales
Act, for breach of the implied warranties of wholesomeness and fitness even
though the goods were sold in their original package. 2' This has been very aptly
referred to as the "Achilles heel" of the vendor who relies on the "original package" doctrine to escape liability. A recent decision permits recovery against the
dealer, on the warranty, for oyster shells in a sealed can of oysters.22
Tort Liability-The Manufacturer or Compounder:
1. Under the "original package" doctrine, the manufacturer is liable to the
23
ultimate consumer for injuries caused by defective products.
2. If the goods are under the exclusive control of the one who supplies
them for resale as where for example, although he is not the actual manufacturer,
24
he packs and seals the goods he will be liable in either trespass or assumpsit.
3. If the manufacturer or compounder negligently puts an article on the
market, he may be sued for injuries resultant therefrom, though they were not
packed in original containers. Conceivably the action could be against both the
manufacturer and the immediate vendor as joint tort-feasors if such were the sit25
uation presented.
4. Where the manufacturer uses due care there is no liability for "latent un26
suspected defects."
5. Purveyors of food, such as restaurants, are liable in trespass for the sale
27
of defective food.
Contract Liability:
1. An action for breach of the impliid warranties will lie against a manufacturer or compounder for defects negligently arising from the manufacture or
compounding whereby the purchaser is injured. The warranties are not limited
20Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 306, 307
21Eldredge,
22

(1941).

Bonenbeiger v. Pitt. Merchantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. (2d) 913 (1942). This is a
impression in Pennsylvania and was decided by a divided court. See 47 DIcK. L.
case of first
REV. 124.
23West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965 (1901); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52,
95 A. 931 (1915); Ruzurnailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114; 145 A. 700
(1929); Elizabeth Arden Inc. v. Brown, 107 F. (2d) 938 (C.C.A. 3d 1938).
24Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 106 Pa. Super. 474, 162 A. 687 (1932).
asRace v. Manko, 341 Pa. 17, 17 A. (2d) 422 (1941).
26McSorley v. Katz, 53 Pa, Super. 243 (1913); Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies Milk Co.,
337 Pa. 344, 11 A. (2d) 143 (1940).
27West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932); Levy v. Horn & Hardart
Bk. Co., 103 Pa. Super. 282, 157 A. 369 (1931); Campbell v. G. C. Murphy Co., 122 Pa.
Super. 342, 186 A. 269 (1936); McCabe v. Penna. R. R. Co., 311 Pa. 229, 166 A. 843
(1933); Martin v. Walgreern Co., 4 Fay. L. J. 10 (1940).
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to sales of food or beverage 28 but extend as well to wearing apparel29 and to
facial lotions" ° and similar products.
2. Purveyors of food, such as restaurants, may be sued on the theory of
breach of the implied warranties. 81
3. The non-liability for "latent unsuspected defects" is equally applicable
82
to suits in assumpsit as in trespass.
STANDARD OF CARE

A high degree of care is required of those engaged in the business of manufacturing, purveying or compounding food, beverage, lotions, etc., "to see that
the product is free from foreign or deleterious substances that injuriously affect
the user." 83 "All reasonable, scientific and up-to-date methods must be employed
to obviate the presence of any such injurious substances, and, even where such
methods are employed, where such substances get into the product, whose presence
there possibly could be due to that uncertain human quality,--caelessness, somewhere along the line, the manufacturer is responsible to a member of the public
injured thereby." 4 If the suit is properly maintainable against the immediate vendor, as outlined in the above situations, his duty is the same as that of a manufacturer, that is, a high degree of care is required.
Under the doctrine of the recent case of Ebbert v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co.,3
it would appear that the immediate vendor is under a general duty to inspect before
sale articles not sold in the original packages or he will be held accountable for injuries which an inspection could have prevented. The reader is referred to a
most informative series of articles on this point where the subject is exhaustively
dealt with by Professor Laurence H. Eldredge of the University of Pennsylvania
and Professor D. J. Farage of Dickinson School of Law.86 Whether or not, for
our purpose the duty under the Ebbert case is a new one or one which ought to
exist, and the idea of its existence is not negatived by the cases, the fact is that
there would seem to be such a duty. Mr. Justice Drew, dissenting in the Ebbert
case, said:3 7
2SRozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929); West
v. Katsafanas,
107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
29
Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A. (2d) 502 (1941).
8OMcDaniel v. Wildroot Inc., 35 Lack. Jur. 134 (1934).
81West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
82
3 3 Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies Milk Co., 337 Pa. 344, 11 A. (2d) 143 (1940).
Menaker v. Supplec-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937).
34
Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 116, 145 A. 700 (1929).
Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
85330
86
See Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 306 (1941) ; Farage, Must a
Vendor Inspect Chattels Before Sale-An Answer, 45 DICK. L. REV. 159 (1941); The Reply,
by Professor Eldredge, 45 DICK. L. REv. 269 (1942); Rejoinder, by Professor Farage, 45 DICK.
L. REV. 282 (1941); also the Note by Professor Eldredge following the Rejoinder, 45 DICK. L.
REV. 291 (1941).

8 330 Pa. 257, 270, 198 A. 323. 329 (1938).
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"If I read the opinion of the majority correctly, it imposes the duty
of inspection upon vendors of all articles not sold in sealed packages,
wherever a defect would make the article sold dangerous for use."
BURDEN OF PROOF

While the burden of proof is, of course, on the plaintiff, his is not a heavy
one in these cases for he is aided by an inference of negligence3 8 entitling him to
In the
go to the jury upon showing the foreign substance and injury therefrom."
Rozumailski case, the Supreme Court had the following to say:
"It is a case where the accident proves its own negligent cause, and
the jury would be permitted to infer negligence . . .from the fact
that ground glass had been found in the bottom of the bottle. The
particular dereliction is not shown, nor was it necessary; the negligent
act is demonstrated by showing glass in the bottom of the bottle."
and, in the Madden case, the Superior Court stated:
"Even though the defendant offered evidence uncontradicted to show
that he was not negligent and made reasonable inspection, and there
was no direct contradiction thereof, the plaintiff having shown the
presence of the mouse in the tea, it remained for the jury to say
whether the explanation offered by defendant indicated the use of
proper care."
However, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the foreign substance
was contained in a bottle or container which had been marketed by the defendant
company. In the recent case of Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies40 plaintiff purchased a bottle of milk from the immediate vendor which bottle bore the name of the defendant company. Upon drinking some of the milk he was injured by broken glass
contained within the bottle. Plaintiff neither averred nor produced evidence to
show that th defendant company sold or supplied the dealer with the bottle of
milk purchased by him. The trial court nonsuited him and the Superior Court affirmed this action. The opinion states: "Neither was there any averment or proof
by the plaintiff in this case that the defendant had sold and delivered the bottle
of milk in question to the dealer from whom plaintiff made the purchase." It is
submitted that this case places an undue burden on the plaintiff. Where the manufacturer's name clearly appears on the bottle or cap, as it does in this case, plaintiff ought to be entitled to rely on that and it ought to be sufficient to raise an
inference that the product was marketed by the company whose name it bears.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES

It is well established that consequential damages are recoverable for breach
42
of the implied warranty of wholesomeness. 41 Williston states that where un389 Watkins v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934).
S Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Pa. 700 (1929).
4Olbid. at 118, 145 A. 700, 701 (1929).
41West
v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
42
SALEs (2d Ed. 1924) Sec. 614.
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wholesome food is sold to humans under an express or an implied contract tht
seller is subject "to responsibility for the consequences." The Sales Act48 provides:
"The measure of damage for breach of warranty is the loss directly and naturally
resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty." While
strictly speaking there is a difference between "direct loss" and "consequential
damages" in that the former refers to loss immediately resulting and "consequential".refers to injury indirectly but naturally flowing from a wrongful act 4 in suits
for breach of the implied warranties, the damages are essentially tortious in that
the breach results from the negligence of the defendant, and are not such as are
fixed or controlled by the contract.
In order to be entitled to damages the plaintiff must establish actual physical
injury. "There can be no recovery for injuries resulting from fright, or a nervous shock, unaccompanied by physical injury.'" 5 But, if it is shown that the
person of plaintiff was violated, there may be a recovery for fright or mental anguish which produces physical illness or other physical disturbance. 4" Merely
showing that a wrong has been perpetrated does not entitle one to money damages.
Two things must occur before one has a cause of action, namely, wrong and damage. ". . . it is the conjunction of damage and wrong that creates a tort and there
is no tort if either damage or wrong is wanting.' '4 It would seem that if the action were on the contract and plaintiff proved the breach of warranty, in that the
goods were defective (a prima facie case) but could prove no damages, that he
would be entitled to contract damages in the absence of satisfactory proof of due
care by the defendant." He would, in this instance, be restricted to the price paid
for the defective goods.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE CASES

For convenience the following classification of the reported decisions will
be used:

3

(a)

Restaurant cases

(b)

Beverage cases

(c)

Food cases (i. e. for consumption off the premises)

(d)

Wearing apparel cases

(e)

Drugs, cosmetics and lotions

(f)
(g)

Household appliances
Exploding container cases

4 Act of May
44

19,

1915,

P. L.

543,

563; 69 P.

S.

314.

Re Soldier's & Sailor's Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 162 A. 309 (1932);

Com. v.

Puloka, 323 Pa. 36, 185 A. 801 (1936).
45Koplirn
v. L. K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 335, 185 A. 744 (1936).
46
Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937).
471 COOLEY oN TORTS (4th Ed. 1932), Sec. 46.
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(a)

RESTAURANT CASES

In Levy v. Horn and Hardart Bk. Co.48 the customer suffered a lacerated
throat as the result of coughing up a small screw in a cup of coffee. Recovery was
had in trespass, in the amount of $524. Campbell v. G. C. Murphy Co. 49 was an
action in trespass for serving a contaminated chicken salad sandwich. Plaintiff received a verdict of $1000, which was, however, reversed by the appellate court for
errors of the trial judge. The Superior Court said: "The circumstances of the
present case, we believe, were sufficient to form the basis for an inference by the
jury that the sandwich furnished plaintiff was unwholesome." In this case plaintiff, who had only a cup of coffee on the day in question, ate a sandwich at defendant's restaurant and within a half hour thereafter complained of feeling ill. A
few hours later a physician who was called diagnosed her illness as food poisoning.
It was also shown that a sister who was with plaintiff ate the same thing and became ill simultaneously and in a similar manner. On this testimony an inference
of negligence was raised which shifted the burden to defendant to prove due care,
the question of whether it had done so being for the jury. The judgment of the
trial court was reversed for improperly admitting testimony concerning "admissions" by employees of the defendant, who were without authority to do so.
McCabe v. Pennsylvania R. R. 50 is a case where a passenger on defendant's train
was served a jelly omelet and sustained cuts and other damage. Investigation revealed that the top of the jelly jar was freshly broken. The verdict of the jury
gave plaintiff $15,000 on which judgment was entered. This was reversed on
appeal because of the refusal of the court below to grant a new trial on the basis
of after discovered evidence involving inconsistent statements of plaintiff pertinent
to the damages he allegedly suffered. Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett5 1 is a leading
case on the element of damages in these situations. There plaintiff noticed a
centipede on her spoon with which she was about to partake soup. The sight caused
her mental anguish and nausea set in making her ill. Recovery in her trespass
action was denied on the doctrine that damages are not recoverable for fright or
mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury. In the now famous case of
West v. Katsafanas,52 the suit was in assumpsit on the implied warranties and resulted in a $537 verdict for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, the appellate court holding: (a) that in a transaction where one purchases food in a restaurant for consumption a sale takes place and the warranties attach; (b) that the
implied warranties were breached by selling plaintiff a pork sandwich which caused
her to become ill from food poisoning. Martin v. Walgreen Co. 53 was in trespass
for negligently allowing a water bug to be baked in a meat pie. Plaintiff uncovered
48103 Pa. Super. 282, 157 A. 369 (1931).
49122 Pa. Super. 342, 186 A. 269 (1936).
50311 Pa. 229, 166 A. 843 (1933).
61322 Pa. 333, 185 A. 744 (1936).
52107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
534 fay. L. J. 10 (1940).
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the foreign substance on her plate and noting that the legs were missing became
nauseated from the thought that she might have eaten them. There was no proof
that she had. In nonsuiting her the trial court held that the case was ruled by
the Koplin case.
(b)

BEVERAGE CASES

The leading case in this category is Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 54 which resulted in a $3000 judgment for plaintiff for injuries
caused by the negligence of the defendant in allowing ground glass to be present
in a bottle of beverage. In Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works,5 5 the suit was in
trespass for damage done by negligently permitting a worm to be in the bottled
beverage. Plaintiff felt the worm, part of which was still in the bottle, crawling
on her lips. Illness followed this disturbing observation for which the jury allowed $500. Cunningham v. Coca-Cola Works 56 was also a case where the negligence consisted of allowing a worm to be present in the bottled beverage. The
verdict of $450 was reduced to $250 for certain errors of the trial court in allowing the jury to pass on items of damage, some of which were erroneously before it.
1
Bilk v. Abbott Dairies"
is the case where plaintiff was injured by glass in a bottle
of milk but was nonsuited for failure to aver and prove delivery of the particular
bottle by defendant company.
(c) FOOD CASES
(Purchased for Consumption Off the Premises.)
In Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.' 8 wife plaintiff became ill after drinking some tea purchased in a sealed package from defendant's store. Investigation
showed part of a "dead and crushed mouse" in the package. Suit was in trespass
and plaintiffs (the husband was also a plaintiff) recovered $600 for this negligence. In this case the "original package" rule was applicable since defendant
exercised exclusive control over the tea from the date of its importation until the
sale, and was the packer of the tea. Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-lones Milk Co.5 9
resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for illness caused by negligently permitting part
of a dead mouse to be in a can of ice cream. The consumer bit into the cream and
discovered the mouse in his mouth. The facts showed that the foreign substance
was in the ice cream when it left the manufacturer. Galda v. Maurer's Dairy Co.60
differed from the Menaker case in that there the ice cream was scooped by dipper
from a bulk container. The court held in the Galda case that the facts did not
raise an inference (the court says "presumption") of negligence and plaintiff was
54296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929).
55102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
5683 P. L. J. 439 (1934).

57147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A. (2d) 342 (1942).
58106 Pa. Super. 474, 162 A. 687 (1932).
59125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937).

6015 Northumb. L. J. 54 (1941).
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nonsuited in her trespass action. Radvan v. Co-ed Candy Co.6 involved an action for injuries sustained from biting into a piece of candy containing ground
glass. The plaintiff recovered $25. Rozonsky v. Union Bakery62 was an action
in trespass for negligently allowing a pin to be encased in a loaf of bread. The
verdict of the jury was for the defendant. In Catani v. Swift & Co.,63 a leading
case, plaintiff recovered $3000 for the negligence of the company in marketing
pork causing sickness from trichinae. This was followed a few years later by the
Tavani case 64 which is very similar in its facts but in which the same defendant
succeeded in establishing due care and the jury return-ed a verdict for it. The appellate court held that defendant had produced sufficient evidence of due cam to
sustain the verdict. Werner v. Armour Co. 65 was an unsuccessful effort to hold
defendant liable for injuries sustained from eating liverwurst containing glass.
There was no proof that defendant retained control over the article which was not
sealed in its original container. The case of Kierstein v. Cudahy Co. 66 was an effort to infer the defendant's negligence from a breach of a Federal penal statute
regulating the method of packing meats. Plaintiff was nonsuited. Quinn v.
Swift & Co. 67 resulted in a $560 verdict, the injury being illness produced by eating sausages containing pieces of sharp metal contained in the unbroken skins of
the meat. This opinion by Johnson, J., exhaustively reviews the pertinent authorities in all the jurisdictions. Graham v. Swift & Co.68 was an action in trespass for
injuries sustained by eating a product of the defendant containing glass and resulted in a $500 verdict and judgment. In Bonenberger v. Pitt. Merchantile Co., the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed the consumer to recover from the immediate
vendor for oyster shells in a can of oysters which when eaten cut the diner's
mouth.6 9
(d)

WEARING APPAREL

The case of Checchio v. S. Goldman Sons70 was a suit in trespass against the
immediate vendor for injuries allegedly caused by an injurious substance in the
leather of slippers resulting in foot poisoning. Plaintiff was nonsuited, the defendant not being the manufacturer of the shoes and selling from regular stock
and not being aware of anything to make him suspicious of a defect in the article.
One is forced to question the wisdom of bringing this suit in the manner in which
it was done. It seems apparent that trespass could have been maintained against
the manufacturer, or plaintiff could have proceeded against the dealer on the im6183 P. L. J. 562 (1934).
6283 P. L.J. 378 (1934).
63251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915).
64262 Pa. 184, 105 A. 55 (1918).

65320 Pa. 440, 183 A. 48 (1936).
6680 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 3d, 1935).
6720 Fed. Suppl. 234 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
6883 P. L. J. 642 (1935).
69345 Pa. 559, 28 A. (2d) 913 (1942).

708 D. & C. 1 (1926).
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plied warranties. This case, however, was tried in 1926, at which time there was
considerable confusion in the manner of bringing suits of this nature. In Barrett
v. S. S. Kresge Co., 71 a very recent decision, the Superior Court held that there can
be no recovery for breach of warranty resulting from a "buyer's individual idiosyncrasy." The case involved the purchase of a cotton dress by plaintiff at defendant's store as the result of wearing which a severe skin irritation was contracted.
Defendant showed by competent testimony that the dress contained no substance
which would cause injury to the skin of a normal person. The verdict for $1600
was set aside by the court on motion non obstante veredicto, and the Superior Court
affirmed this action. The opinion by Baldrige, J., does say, however, that the
implied warranties attach to a sale of wearing apparel. "No sound distinction," the
Judge writes, 72 "can probably be logically drawn between a noxious thing taken
internally and wearing apparel containing a poisonous dye, meant to be worn next
73
to the skin.''
(e)

HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES

Ebbert v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co., 7 4 discussed above, was a suit in trespass
against the immediate vendor for injuries resulting to the wife plaintiff from a
defective washing machine wringer. A verdict thereon for $1108 was affirmed by
the Supreme Court. This is the case above referred to, which would seem to impose a general duty of inspection on vendors of articles sold other than in their
original package. Defendant had "warranted" that the device was safe. Mr.
Justice Maxey, speaking for the Court, says that the facts of the case do not present
a situation where the dealer was "a mere conduit from the manufacturer to the
consumer." Pointing out that the dealer had "warranted" the safety of the wringer, Justice Maxey states that he breached a duty which h'e was paid to perform, the
price of the article reflecting this. The Court, through Mr. Justice Maxey, says:
"While not differing with the trial court and the Superior Court in basing defendant's liability on breach of warranty, we think an equally solid basis for recovery
is defendant's inadequate performance of the duty of inspection and demonstration." (Italics supplied.) Mr. Justice Drew dissents, on the ground that there
75
is no such thing as a duty of inspection on a vendor of articles, imposed by law.
The Justice, after pointing out that he considers the majority opinion as imposing
such a duty, writes: "I think the holding goes far beyond the warrant of any satisfactory authority anywhere." The writer of the dissenting opinion further implies that he disagrees with the "creation" of what he feels a "new" duty, for he
states: "It seems to me to place an unfair burden on business." In Barouge v.
Frank & Seder, Inc. 76 plaintiff recovered a $1300 verdict, the defendant's negli71144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A. (2d) 502 (1941).
721bid. at 520, 19 A. (2d) 502, 503 (1941).
78
For cases in other jurisdictions, see 27 A. L. R. 1504; 121 A. L. R. 460.
'4330 Pa. 257, 268, 198 A. 323, 330 (1938).
751bid. at 270, 198 A. 323, 332 (1938).
7835 Lack. Jur. 134, 22 D. & C. 287 (1934).
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gence consisting of supplying a visibly defective bed and subsequently assuring
plaintiff of its safety. The bed collapsed the first time it was used and plaintiff
was hurt when she was thrown to the floor. Lundy v. Devitt7 involved a ladder
which fell when the plaintiff stepped on it in defendant's store. The Court set
aside a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that the ladder was defective or unsafe. The question of plaintiff's
contributory negligence was also involved.
(f)

DRUGS, COSMETICS AND LOTIONS

West v. Emanuel,78 the origin of the "original package" doctrine in Pennsylvania, was an action for wrongful death against a druggist from whom decedent had purchased a package of headache powder. Death followed shortly after
some of the powder had been taken. Plaintiff was nonsuited, which action was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, which stated: "The druggist was not required to
analyze the contents of each bottle or package he receives." McDaniel v. Wildroot Co. 79 resulted in a recovery for injury to the head from using defendant's
tonic, the suit being on the implied warranty. Elizabeth Arden Inc. v. Brown80
was an action against both the compounder and the immediate vendor of a lotion.
The latter was held to come under the "original package" doctrine and as to him
a nonsuit was entered for that reason. The manufacturer was held not liable because plaintiff had not shown any negligence inasmuch as the lotion was not proven
unsafe for use and did not contain the elements it was alleged to contain by plaintiff.8 1

(g)

EXPLODING CONTAINERS

The first of the cases of this type is McSorley v. Katz,82 in which the lid "or
something" flew off a can of molasses when plaintiff was opening it and injured
her in the face and eye. Suit was against the grocer for breach of warranty. Plaintiff was denied recovery on the doctrine of "latent, unsuspected defects." Sweeney
v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co.83 was brought by the storekeeper against the compounder and bottler. She had purchased the bottles in a case which she had
placed on the floor. While turning to wait on a customer plaintiff's dress
"caught" on one of the bottles, which was projected to the floor where it exploded,
and plaintiff was injured by the flying glass. Plaintiff alleged that the company
7728 Del. Co. Rep. 210 (1938).
78198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965 (1901).
7935 Lack. Jur. 134, 22 D. & C. 287 (1934).

80107 F. (2d) 938 (C.C.A. 3d, 1939).

81See Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A. (2d) 743 (1942), holding that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that the injury was due to the extract manufactured by de.
fendant where abscesses formed after injection by the physician. The liability of the physician
was established, however, where he used the substance and same needle with knowledge of harm
resulting to others from this identical method of treatment.
8Z53 Pa. Super. 243 (1913).
83325 Pa. 216. 186 A. 331 (1937).
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was negligent in putting too great an amount of pressure in the bottles and also
that the bottles were defective. In affirming a nonsuit, the Supreme Court
agreed that plaintiff had failed to show any want of due care on defendant's part
especially in view of the fact that it was her careless act in knocking the bottle
down that brought on the explosion. No other bottle burst and there was nothing
to show that without the force supplied inadvertently by plaintiff that it would
have -exploded. In the recent case of Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies8 4 the principle
of non-liability for "latent and unsuspected" defects was again applied. In this
case plaintiff, a grocer, was engaged in putting milk which he had received shortly before, into his refrigerator when the bottle he was holding suddenly burst, injuring him. The company did not manufacture the bottle. The Supreme Court,
in affirming a nonsuit, stated:
"The limit of its (defendant's) duty was to provide against defects
discernible upon reasonable inspection and to handle the bottles with
reasonable care."
Plaintiff was unable to show that defendant had failed in any of these duties but
contended that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. In denying this
the court points out that defendant did not make the bottles and the condition causing the accident could not be said to be one over which it exercised exclusive control. s5
The case of Kuntz v. Pepsi-Cola Co.86 recently decided by the Allegheny
County Common Pleas Court, is in some degree. an unusual one. There plaintiff
storekeeper was about to open a bottle for a customer but before she had applied
any force it exploded and she was injured by the shattered glass. The verdict was
for plaintiff which was allowed to stand by the court on motion for judgment n.
o. v. The court found it necessary to distinguish the three cases cited, under this
heading, holding the Coralnick case distinguished by reason of the fact that in
the instant case defendant admitted knowledge that its bottles had burst in the
past although testifying that it had changed its bottles and used one demonstrated
as better capable of withstanding pressure. It is submitted that this was testimony
of due care, which was the "limit of its duty." 87 Although the suit was an action
in assumpsit on the breach of implied warranties, it is submitted that the question
was properly one for the jury, although it is difficult to reconcile the court's discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Nowhere in the case is there any discussion of what warranty the plaintiff is suing on. If the case be deemed an action in negligence, as it seems to have been on trial, perhaps the manner in which
suit was brought will not be fatal to the plaintiff. But it is to be noted that there

84337 Pa. 344, 11 A. (2d) 143 (1940).
85Norris v. Phila. Electric Co., 534 Pa. 161, 5 A. (2d) 114 (1939).
8689 P. L. J. 558 (1940).
87Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies Milk Co., 337 Pa. 344, 11 A. (2d) 143 (1940).
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are no Pennsylvania cases holding that the warranty of merchantability extends to
the container. A very similar case arose in Illinois and it was there held that the
container is not included in the warranty of merchantability.88
DOCTRINE OF BAXTER V. FORD MOTOR CO.

No discussion of this kind would be complete without some mention of the
now famous case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.8 9 Plaintiff had purchased a new;
car, relying on the representations of the dealer that the car was equipped with a
shatter-proof windshield. To "demonstrate" this the dealer had shown the plaintiff advertising matter supplied by the manufacturer in which this claim was
made. While riding in the car a pebble flew against the windshield which immediately shattered, injuring plaintiff. He brought suit for breach of warranty. On
trial no negligence on the part of the Ford Company was shown but it was shown
that plaintiff could not have purchased a better windshield. The trial judge nonsuited plaintiff on the theory that there was no privity to support the action. This
was reversed by the Supreme Court of Washington which permitted recovery. The
Court compared the case with the situation where a member of the public is injured because a manufacturer of drugs has wrongly labelled a bottle. Perhaps,
however, the gist of the decision is to be ascertained by the following excerpt from
the opinion:
"Radio, billboards, and the products of the printing press have become the means of creating a large part of the demand that causes
goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be
unjust to recognize a rule that would permit a manufacturer of goods
to create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not possess; and then, because
there is no privily (italics supplied) existing between the consumer
and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if
damages result from th-e absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily discernible."
Social expediency, then, would seem to be the real answer to the Baxter case, and
whether we are in accord with this policy or not, it must be conceded that it does
present a fascinating legal problem. It is almost impossible to "classify" the case
into the usual channels, and we join with Professor Paul A. Leidy in wondering if
the Washington Court has not "created" a new tort.8" We cannot opine what
the Pennsylvania courts will do if a similar problem comes before them. But our
courts have shown a reluctance to "create" new causes of action, as for example
91
defamation by radio against the originator of the defaming program.
88Crandall v. Stop & Shop, 288 Ill. App. 543; 6 N. E. (2d) 685 (1937).
89168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932); 15 P. (2d) 1118 (1932); 179 Wash. 123,
35 P. (2d) 1090 (1934).
90Ieidy, Another New Tort?, 38 MICHIGAN L. REV. 964 (1940); 7 CURRENT LEGAL
THOUGHT
9

168 (1940).

1Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d)

302 (1930).
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"BALANCING THE EQUITIES"

One wonders if new problems can always be answered by old principles.
Perhaps, as society becomes more and more mechanized old principles may sometimes have to be discarded in favor of new ones. It is, of course, a step to be
taken most cautiously lest injury be done those who, in good faith, rely on established modes of conduct. Lord Coke's famous and oft' quoted, "The known
certainty of the law is the safety of all" is a principle well worth preserving where-ever it can be done without doing some greater harm. The equities in favor of
the vendor must be carefully balanced against those in favor of the public. We
have attempted in this paper to show how the Courts of Pennsylvania have been
doing that very thing by reviewing the reported decisions. This "balancing of the
equities" is the peculiar duty of the courts, especially the appellate tribunals, for
itis of the very essence of the judicial function. Decisions, for example, like the
Emanuel case, 9 2 the Rozumailski case,9 3 the West case, 94 the Nock case, 95 the
Ebbert case,96 the Catanicase, 9" the Coralnick case,9 8 the Barrett case, 99 are tremendously far reaching in their effect. Every manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer and
every consumer of these foods or drinks or wearing apparel or similar products
is materially concerned.
The public today is served with better and more wholesome food and drink and
no small part of the credit for this belongs to the courts which have defined and
insisted upon the maintenance of high standards which the compounder must meet.
It is not only in the recovery had by an injured plaintiff that the courts wield their
power for good. It is in the norms set up by them that our real benefit comes.
The decisions set the required standard of conduct, they are beacons of light to
the manufacturer and protective shelters for the consumer. It is by meeting these
requirements on the part of business that public confidence is attained and increased sales merited. The legitimate business man gains while the business charlatan is driven off. Verily, we may say, in humble thanksgiving, "God save the
Commonwealth and the Honorable Court."
York, Pa.
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